As a case study contributing to empirical and inductive specifications of the jus post bellum principle for reparations, the author conducts an analysis of a provision of the Treaty of Peace with Japan that mandates that Japan make reparations from attached Japanese assets in neutral and ex-Axis countries to compensate the Allied prisoners of war. This study's findings elucidate the legal significance of the provision that war reparations can be qualitatively alleviated by virtue of substituting assets for pecuniary reparations, hence presenting inductive substantiation for implementing the jus post bellum principle for reparations.
INTRODUCTION
In a series of academic inquiries on jus post bellum, a legal framework for norms applied to post-war peacebuilding,party to the peace treaty. 16 According to the above analysis, the author reads the United States' actions as passive regarding the absence of provisions in the peace treaty carrying legal effect on the issue of Japanese property remaining within neutral countries.
The United States evidenced its passivity on the issue of Japanese property in neutral countries through the interim reparations program during the initial phases of Japan's occupation. Edwin Pauley's December 7, 1945 statement recommended removing any external Japanese assets, including those in neutral countries. 17 However, Pauley's report of December 18, 1945 . 16 "Notes of Meeting on Thursday, July 3, 1947 Exchange" that Japan had no assets of substance in neutral countries, 18 but never stated such under the section "Deprive Japan of All External Assets." 19 
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF RESTORATION
From 1948, the United States initiated the conversion of its reparations policy, discontinuing the exaction of interim reparations in 1949. Furthermore, it drew up the drafts of the treaty with Japan, implying that Japanese property in neutral countries would not be used for reparations. This is to say that the drafts created no legal effects of obliging Japan to pay reparations from such property. The
Overseas Consultants report of February 26, 1948, recommended against removing productive facilities in Japan in an effort to return the Japanese economy to a selfsupporting status. 20 The Johnston report of May 19, 1948 , agreed with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that Japan's peaceful industrial recovery was necessary to bring about a self-supporting economy and the recovery program became a primary objective of the occupation. 21 Consequently, the National 
JAPAN
On the face of the Seven-point Memorandum, Japan could grasp, albeit uncertainly, the United States' legal effect and intention to return Japanese assets in neutral countries. Initially, Japan assumed that Japanese property within neutral countries would not be used for reparations but for discharging Japan's liabilities corresponding to the credits of the Allies and neutrals. 34 However, on knowing the contents of the Seven-point Memorandum before the acquisition and after examination, Japan commented on the sixth point, stating that Japanese assets in neutrals could be interpreted as temporarily restored to Japan. 35 The United States and Japan, whose internal views presupposed the legal effect of restoration in this vein, initialed the memorandum as toward the peace treaty, shaping an interim understanding. On January 26, 1951, although the United States delivered the Seven-point Memorandum 36 and the agenda to Japan, the sole hare come up in the agenda concerned Japanese gold. 37 The that pursuit of agreement for division of Japanese assets in neutrals and ex-Axis countries among four powers could be the sole solution wherein the Soviet Union and China would be expected to participate. 48 However, the United Kingdom merely submitted the provision of the peace treaty that Japanese overseas assets should under no circumstance be returned to Japan. 49 Hence, considering these movements of the British Commonwealth and the United Kingdom, it is apparent that the United Kingdom considered the legal effect of appropriating Japanese property in neutral and ex-Axis countries for reparations but did not attempt to codify this legal effect.
CODIFYING THE LEGAL EFFECT OF APPROPRIATION FOR REPARATIONS
In the March 1, 1951 draft, the United Kingdom codified its legal effect that Japanese assets within neutral and ex-enemy countries apply to reparations, laying its special prior claim about its prisoners of war. In other words, the grammatical interpretation of the relevant provisions of this draft led to the legal effect of appropriation. The chapter entitled, "Japanese Assets in Neutral Countries,"
provided that (1) the Japanese government transfer all Japanese assets of whatever nature located in territories of neutral countries at the time of surrender to the governments of the four powers (Paragraph 74); (2) In "Japanese Assets in Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania (sic), Finland, Italy, and Siam," it was enacted that Japanese assets in ex-enemy countries be subject to delivery to the Allies, absolved from responsibility and appropriated for reparations in the same fashion as the assets in neutrals (Paragraphs 77-79). 
DISSENSION BETWEEN TWO LEGAL EFFECTS

EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
Interchanging memoranda revealed the antagonism between the United
States' legal effect of restoration and United Kingdom's legal effect of appropriation, accompanying competition for their respective peculiar claims lain at the root. The United Kingdom's aide-mémoire, addressing the United States on March 12, 1951, asserted that Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries not be returned to Japan, 53 inferring the use of these assets as reparations. The United States' aidemémoire, sent to the United Kingdom the following day, reserved its position on the question of Japanese property in ex-enemy states, clarifying its direction toward making no effort to recover Japanese assets in neutral countries for the Allies.
54
The United States specified their reasons for contradicting the United Kingdom's legal effect of appropriation, as follows: (1) the total amount of Japanese property in neutral countries was relatively small; (2) a question stemmed as to whether the efficiencies achieved would be worth the endeavor to allot such assets for reparations; (3) the United States had prior claims for occupation costs; and (4) 50 "Japanese Peace effectiveness, questioned whether the neutral countries could be expected to give effect to the peace treaty provision transferring Japanese assets in their territories to the Allies. 61 Moreover, the document, claiming the elimination of the British provision that Japanese assets in ex-enemy countries be used as reparations, directed counterarguments to such a clause: (1) predictions were that Italy, which had joined the Allied Powers at the end game of the war, would object to the British provision that Italy could savor its right to retain and liquidate Japanese assets in its territory, as with the Allies; (2) the provision in question of the British draft of the Treaty of Peace with Japan ran counter to returning ex-Axis property in Germany to the former enemy states on the basis of peace treaties with other exenemy countries; and (3) the United States could not acquiesce to such a provision for delivering Japanese assets to the four powers, but to a hypothetical stipulation that the United Kingdom be justified to satisfy its special claim. that the import of the legal effect of substitution was the eschewal of Japan's money disbursement. It succeeded in the acquisition of Japan's virtual consent.
During the June 25 talks with Japan, the United States illustrated the strong feelings from the United Kingdom and Australia that prisoners of war receive compensation, so that the United States advised Japan to make reparations, proposing a lenient solution that additional expenditures by Japan would not be required and contriving that Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries, which were difficult to return to Japan because of distraint by the Soviet Union as a co-trustee, be turned over to ICRC for the Allied prisoners of war. 73 In response, Article 16 of the July 3 draft provided that: "As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14(a)2(I)(ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions".
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not vary the legal effect of substitution despite limiting the kinds of Japanese property subject to this effect.
The United States pushed the return of the proceeds from the sale of Japan's stocks of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) within neutral countries to Japan; consequently, such turnover was excluded from the legal effect of substitution. In the June 25 talks with Japan, the United States enunciated objections against the United Kingdom's contention that Japan renounce its rights, including shares of BIS, agreeing that Japan could sell its stocks and vest with the proceeds from the sale. 80 In the June 28 talks with Japan, the United States confirmed that proceeds from the sale of Japan's shares in BIS should revert to Japan and not be treated as Japanese assets in neutral countries. 81 Consequently, an expression excepting Japan's shares in BIS from transfer was constituted anew 82 to prevent any interpretation that such shares would also be transferred to ICRC as a result of Article 8(c), providing that Japan renounce all rights acquired under the Statute of BIS. 83 Hence, the grammatical interpretation of Article 16 clarified that the legal effect of substitution did not range over Japan's stocks of BIS, whilst this effect was properly analyzed to be retained.
Japan asked for the clarification that Japan not be required to restore losses of damaged or consumed assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries but only be required to relinquish its existing assets in their status quo or their equivalent to ICRC. Subsequently, the legal effect of Article 16 was limited to substituting Japan's existing assets for monetary reparations. In the July 12 opinion note addressed to the United States, Japan insisted that the words "or the equivalent of such assets" inserted in Article 16 in the July 3 draft did not mean that Japan deliver complements to damaged or consumed assets, but that Japan might transfer, in lieu of Japanese assets that existed, the equivalent of those assets if Japan so desired. 84 At Japan's insistence, the draft, which had been sent to the Allies on July 20, changed the foregoing words of the July 3 draft to "or at its option, the equivalent of such assets," 85 implying a limitation to the transfer of existing assets Therefore, Article 16 of the final August 16 draft added an exclusion of the assets of Japanese people who did not reside in Japan when the treaty was implemented;
Japan's aforementioned interpretation was strongly restrained. 91 In other words, the grammatical interpretation of Article 16 of the final draft showed that the retentive legal effect of substitution did not run to those assets of Japanese people.
CONFINING OBJECT COUNTRIES
The United States schemed to persuade the United Kingdom into assenting to the United States' desire to leave Thailand the title of Japanese assets within Thai territory, on which the two powers reserved their positions from the AngloAmerican dialogue of June 13, 1951. In the July 18 memorandum, considering the 86 The fact that payment of equivalences was stipulated in the clause did not imply the adoption of pecuniary reparations on first sight, for Japan had the absolute option with regard to transferring the equivalent of existing assets. Hence, whether the legal effect of substitution transfigured was not discernible. 
CONFIRMATION OF JAPAN'S FREE WILL
ICRC sought to confirm that Japan was under obligation to the legal effect of substitution on its own free will. The epistle from the president of ICRC, enclosed in the letter from the president of the Japanese Red Cross Society and read by the Japanese government on August 10, 1951, requested the government to render confirmation in writing, reassuring ICRC that the obligations undertaken by Japan under Article 16 were indeed based on freely-arrived approval.
95
After signing the treaty, Japan recognized that it had accepted the legal effect of substitution on its own accord. In the August 10 draft of courses of action, Japan immediate proclamation with respect to freewill acceptance. 96 The August 13
response to the president of the Japanese Red Cross Society promised that Japan would reply to ICRC another time following the signature of the treaty. 97 In the August 18 letter to the counselor of ICRC, Japan represented that its government was prepared to give a statement about its acceptance of the obligation on voluntary basis to ICRC after the signing. 98 After signing the treaty, Japan would inform ICRC that the Japanese government had accepted the obligations under Article 16 on its own free will in a letter to the president of ICRC, which was not delivered. 99 The above context regarding Japan's free will yielded no transfiguration of the legal effect of substitution. 
THE PURVIEW OF THE BENEFICIARIES
23
The legal effect of substitution was achieved by virtue of monetary payments as the equivalent of Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries at the option of Japan. Although Japan intended to substitute its deposited balances in the Bank of Switzerland for pecuniary reparations as indemnification to Allied prisoners of war, the Swiss government declined to take the necessary steps for Japan to withdraw savings from the bank to substitute as reparations under Article 16 because the Swiss Confederation had represented Japanese interests during the war and made advances on their behalf; therefore, they believed they had a prior claim for reimbursement. 105 Accordingly, a conference between the United Kingdom and Japan confirmed that its obligation to the Allies under Article 16 became entirely fulfilled by means of depositing £4,500,000 to ICRC in May 1955. 106 However, Japan's disbursement of this money only meant that Japan opted to separate substituting its assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries for pecuniary reparations and paying the equivalent of those assets, so that the analysis adopted by Article 16 under the legal effect of substitution could not be reversed in hindsight.
As previously mentioned in the Introduction, the author considers the legal significance of Article 16 on the basis of its legal effect. The legal significance of this provision premised on the legal effect of substitution can be deemed a qualitative alleviation of war reparations. Indeed, the bulk of Japanese property in neutral and ex-Axis countries was bank balances; 107 hence, transferring those assets made little difference on the surface relative to pecuniary reparations equal to the deposits. However, given that these savings were distrained and not fluid, conveyance of Japan's bank credits in place of ready cash could be considered not quantitative diminution but qualitative alleviation of reparations for Japan when compared with reparations from hard money with extreme fluidity. 
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